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III

Abstract
In this thesis we propose a sketch towards an outwardly understanding of the nature of
consciousness. We begin by arguing that all thought involves phenomenal character, then establish
that all phenomenal character involves phenomenal concepts, which allows us to conclude that all
thought involves phenomenal concepts. Finally, we survey the philosophical theoretical space to
ground our thesis within established theories of consciousness, perception, and epistemology.
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Introduction
In the start of their book Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson identified
three main findings of cognitive science which they claim stand in opposition to most classical
philosophical traditions. These are: “The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly
unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical” 1 . They proceed to explain that our
understanding of reason has a bearing on our understanding of what it is to be human. They cite
Cartesian mind/body duality, Kantian transcendentalism, and phenomenology as some of the
traditions which dictated and skewed our conception of the nature of rationality, cognition, and
consciousness, mainly due to their speculative nature rather than their dependence on empirical
data.
This thesis follows on the footsteps of Lakoff and Johnson and many philosophers of mind,
especially on the analytic side, who take the empirical side of philosophy to heart. The first claim
is that the nature of consciousness itself does not allow for what we would refer to as completely
subjective thinking, or inward thinking, that is thinking which is completely isolated from the
world. We rather argue that since the nature of consciousness itself is outwardly, which means that
it is constantly seeking stimuli, then thinking is also outwardly in nature. That is to say, not only
do stimuli necessarily feature into our thinking, but they make it possible in the first place.
In the first and second chapter, we argue two propositions:
1. All thinking involves phenomenal character
2. All phenomenal character involves phenomenal concepts
which allow us to syllogistically conclude that:
∴ All thinking involves phenomenal concepts

1

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh. (New York: Basic books, 1999), 25, E-Book.
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To put it simply, since thinking always involves phenomenal character which is the direct product
of coming in contact with stimuli, and since this phenomenal character is always accompanied by
phenomenal concepts, then thinking necessarily involves phenomenal concepts.2
The thesis adopts a neurophilosophical theoretical framework, where we take it that the
findings of neuroscience, along with related disciplines to the empirical study of mind such as
cognitive psychology, are pivotal to our understanding of the nature of our consciousness. In the
third chapter, we survey the philosophical theoretical space in order to ground our thesis within
established doctrines of theories of consciousness, perception, and epistemology.
What we need to make clear is that we do not believe that Lakoff and Johnson’s criticism
of speculative philosophy is strictly directed towards the philosophers they named, but rather
towards their contemporary following who still operate within these parameters which empirical
research has put to the test. If we take Descartes for example, we will find that he was operating
within the parameters of the most technological advancements of his time. As Michael O’Shea
explains,
“[i]n one important respect Descartes was breaking new ground. By comparing the
workings of the brain with that of complex hydraulic machines, he was regarding the most
technologically advanced artefacts of his day as templates for understanding the brain. This
is a tradition that persists today; when we refer to computers and computational operations
as models of how the brain acquires, processes, and stores information, for example. So
while Descartes was hopelessly wrong in detail, he was adopting a modern style of
reasoning”3.
This is evident in Descartes break with the traditional Scholastic understanding of perceptual
cognition. The Scholastics believed that

2

Think of phenomenal character as the fuel that allows for there to be thought at all. While the content of a thought
might not be that phenomenal character, if, say, the thought is about mathematics or about another thought, it is still
only possible to have that thought because of the availability of some phenomenal character. Thus, phenomenal
character is necessary for the process of thought but not necessarily to feature as its content.
3
Michael O’Shea, The Brain: A Very Short Introduction. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 16.
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perceptual cognition would take place in animals in the imagination, because they lack an
intellect, so the imagination is the highest faculty they possess; whereas, in the case of
human beings, it is in the higher faculty of the intellect that perceptual cognition (like
intellectual cognition) takes place.4
Descartes, on the other hand, believed in a direct link between the intellect and information from
sense organs through the imagination (located in the penial gland). Thus, the difference between
him and the Scholastics was that “whereas the imagination in the mindless animal has only one
input, a sensory one, that in the human being has a sensory and an intellectual input”5. This direct
link allowed Descartes to then reject the modularity of the human mind, arguing for the unity of
the soul, giving that chief among his metaphysical commitments was that a fragmented soul is
incapable of having free will6.
This brief account is not in defense of Descartes, but to showcase that the progress of
philosophical inquiry has long depended on new advancements in our understanding of how the
mind works. It thus seems odd that, in an age of such fundamental breakthroughs in our conception
of the mind, thanks to advancements in neuroscience, cognitive science, biological psychology,
etc., that these ideas did not correct, and automatically disqualify, certain classical philosophical
conceptions which we held in such high regard only in virtue of having no way of decisively
discrediting them. As the world moves more and more towards a better understanding of
consciousness based on empirical findings, we find it imperative to follow suit and present a thesis
which tracks and present some of the modern key discoveries regarding the nature of cognition
and thought. In the same spirit of adopting the most technological advancement in philosophical
inquiry, we begin our investigation into the nature of consciousness.

4

Stephen Gaukroger. Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy. (Cambridge University Press: 2002), 220
Gaukroger, Descartes', 220
6
Gaukroger, Descartes', 223
5
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Chapter I: On Sensory Restriction
Section I: An Introduction to Sensory Restriction
1. Descartes, Empirically Speaking
In our introduction, we briefly touched upon Descartes conception of perceptual cognition. To
explicate more, Descartes maintained that it involves three things
The first is the corporeal world, the second the pure intellect, which contains abstractions,
and the third the imagination, which is a corporeal organ which Descartes will later identify
with the pineal gland. 7 […] The intellect understands ‘five-ness’ as something separate
from five objects (or line segments, or points, or whatever), and hence the imagination is
required if this ‘fiveness’ is to correspond to something in the world.8 […] The imagination
represents to itself the contents of the world and it represents to itself the contents of the
intellect, and perceptual cognition takes place when it maps these on to one another.9
What we want to do in this chapter is to take an empirical look at this claim. What we essentially
argue is that there cannot be any thought without some kind of perceptual cognition resulting in
phenomenal character10. That is to say, that there cannot be a notion of ‘fiveness’ without the mind
receiving stimulation which allows it to cognize of the notion. Keep in mind this does not say that
the stimulus must be the number 5, but rather that there needs to be any type of stimulation for
consciousness to operate as we know it. What this idea essentially disqualifies is notions such as
Avicenna’s Floating Man argument, which postulates the possibility of the suspension of sensory
experience to argue for the persistence of the soul independent of the body, or that for a mental
state to be conscious there needs to be a higher order thought, as Rosenthal argues. What we are

7

Stephen Gaukroger. Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy. (Cambridge University Press: 2002), 218.
Gaukroger, Descartes', 219
9
Gaukroger, Descartes', 220
10
The phenomenal character is what it is like for one to undergo a certain experience. Given the debate around what
that term means, we want to explain that we use it to mean any subjective experience under the threshold of an
explicitly propositional thought at time t, including sensations, representations, etc. More on that will come in our
discussion of A/P consciousness in chapter 2. This is different from quale-consciousness as the recognition or
identification of a specific what-it-is-like which would involve an explicitly propositional thought.
8
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rather arguing that without stimulation from the world, consciousness becomes in danger. This
means that consciousness is not only a tool to receive stimulation, but also a tool to seek it. The
implication of that includes that an idea such as inward thinking, i.e. thinking which is completely
isolated from worldly stimulation, would not be possible since all thinking involves the residual
phenomenal character which is the result of the brain coming in contact with a stimulus. Thus, we
argue that all thinking involves phenomenal character.
Since the claims regarding the nature of cognition are empirical in nature, we will take a
look at it from an empirical standpoint. The way to do that is to look at what exactly happens if we
deprive the brain from stimulation. In modern psychology, this can be induced in two ways:
sensory and perceptual deprivation. Sensory deprivation, or SD, is defined as “an experimental
environment designed to provide absolute reduction of intensity of input”11 such as “conditions of
darkness or silence” 12 , while Perceptual deprivation, or PD, is “an experimental environment
designed to provide solely homogeneous and unpatterned input” 13 such as “conditions of
homogenous visual stimulation” 14 . In both cases, the subject’s exposure to worldly stimuli is
interrupted in order to test his/her reaction to such interruption. However, before we look at sensory
restriction, let us take a moment to ponder upon the connotations the word stimulus has.
2. On Stimuli
The Latin stimulus denoted a “pointed stick to goad animals”, and the verb stimulare “was used
metaphorically for ‘something that incites or causes a response’”15. The Latin stimulāre initially

11

A. Michael Rossi, “General Methodological Considerations,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research,
ed. John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 18.
12
Marvin Zuckerman, "Variables Affecting Deprivation Results,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research,
ed. John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 50.
13
Rossi, "General Methodological Considerations,” 19.
14
Zuckerman, “Variables,” 50.
15
Lemma stimulate, in: Word Origins, John Ayto, A&C Black, 2nd ed., 2006. Credo Reference,
https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/acbwordorig/stimulate/0?institutionId=6166. Accessed 29 March
2019.

5

meant “to urge forward (an animal) with a goad or a sim” and “to incite to action, spur on, urge,
instigate”16. It evolved in English to become stimulate which means “to prick, sting, afflict”17, and
in German stimuli means Ansporn, Anregung 18 and variants of the verb stimulate include
anregen19, anstacheln and anspornen [to spur on]20. What, upon closer reflection, turns out to be
problematic, is that in all cases, the word denotes a stationary recipient. Especially the verb
anspornen which means ‘to urge on’, is suggesting a more or less idle and inactive party which is
not anticipating a provocation.
We seek to challenge this connotation in this thesis. We take stimulus to denote any
disturbance in the environment which falls within the spectrum of frequencies the conscious mind
would be capable of receiving and categorizing, however, with an anticipatory attitude from the
receiver end. Instead of changing the word, we continue to use it to reflect the role that the
environment plays in the process of perception, and to maintain a naturalistic flavor in our
discussion. However, the semantic adage here, adding anticipation to stimulation, will prove
important in the lines to come. With that out of the way, let us then take a deeper look at both types
of sensory isolation.
3. The Issue with Sensory Restriction
Consider the following account of nurse Winnifred Kelm from a 1961 experiment described by
Mical Raz as “one of the few detailed first-hand descriptions of sensory deprivation experiments”21.
Raz reported that Kelm spent 8.5 days in a dark isolated room where she was instructed to move

16

P. Glare, Oxford Latin Dictionary (2nd ed.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1989). http://www.oed.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/view/Entry/190374. Accessed 13 April 2019
18
M. Clark & Thyen, O, Concise Oxford-Duden German Dictionary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 586.
19
Clark, Concise Oxford-Duden, 586
20
Clark, Concise Oxford-Duden, 748
21
Mical Raz. "Alone again: John Zubek and the troubled history of sensory deprivation research." Journal of the
History of the Behavioral Sciences 49, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 379, https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.21631
17
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as little as possible and had no contact with any of the examiners. She was not to brush her teeth
and was even discouraged from thinking too much. She wore rubber earmuffs which both restricted
her movement on the bed, preventing her from tossing and turning, and isolated her from any noise.
Within a few days, Kelm had entered a state of complete hallucination where, in her mind,
her husband, a psychology graduate student, had been in an accident. She rushed to the
hospital, only to find her husband’s lifeless body being wheeled away. The experimenter’s
report, who observed her throughout her isolation, indicated that she had cried constantly
one entire afternoon and throughout most of the night. When she emerged from the
experiment, after eight and a half days, she was confused, disoriented, and irritable.22
However, not all the literature on sensory restriction has had such wild reports. Vernon & Hoffman
(1956), from the research program at Princeton University, were first to report that “SD might have
beneficial effects on intellectual performance”23. A group of psychologists in Richmond, between
1958 and 1963, have conducted studies to improve “the self-image of psychiatric patients who
underwent sensory deprivation and heard appropriate messages”24. How, then, can two completely
different outcomes occur under the same conditions? To answer that, we need to take a look back
at the history.

Section II: A Sketch of the History of Sensory Restriction Experiments25
We will begin by drawing a distinction between what we take to be the three main phases of
sensory deprivation research: The McGill University phase, John Zubek’s phase, and the modern
phase. Each phase has its own characteristics and its own objectives. The McGill University

22

Raz, “Alone again,” 379.
Austin Jones, "Stimulus-Seeking Behavior,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, ed. John P. Zubek
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 139.
24
Peter Suedfeld, "Introduction and Historical Background," in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, ed.
John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 12.
25
Our review here is by no means exhaustive. However, it serves to illuminate some of the main reasons for the
discrepancy of reported data between different SD and PD experiments throughout the years.
23
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experiments are considered to have initiated the interest in sensory restriction research. In 1951, a
group of psychologists led by D. O. Hebb, developed the experimental sensory deprivation
technique. The primary drive for this was “an interest in Russian and Chinese brainwashing”26
which was later confirmed by Hebb himself in a symposium held at Harvard Medical School27.
The military side of the research objectives here was palpable in contrast to the line of research
adopted by Zubek. Raz concretized the distinction when he maintained that “[w]hile in the setting
of coercive interrogation, sensory deprivation was used to cause discomfort and anxiety, Zubek’s
research, they argued, involved ‘lying in a dark, quiet room’.”28. Zubek himself stated that part of
his objective was to “solve problems such as life in isolated areas in the sparsely populated areas
in Canada’s north”29.
The difference between the two lines of research was reflected in the results from the two
phases. While the experience from Zubek’s experiment was “often ‘pleasant and relaxing’ and had
been proven effective as a means to help people stop smoking” 30 , the McGill university
experiments witnessed more dramatic results. In a PD experiment, Bexton, Heron, and Scott
(1954) reported that “14 subjects were asked about their experiences. All of the subjects reported
some visual sensations. Half of the subjects reported B-type31 sensations; e.g. ‘a row of little men,
a German helmet.’ Three subjects reported animated, integrated scenes of a cartoonlike
character” 32 . In another PD experiment, Woodburn Heron (1961) reported that 25/29 of the

26

Suedfeld, "Introduction and Historical Background,” 9
D. O. Hebb, “Introduction,” in Sensory Deprivation: A Symposium Held at Harvard Medical School, ed. P.
Solomon et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 6.
28
Raz, “Alone again,” 390.
29
No author. (1972). Brainwashing “not the object of research”. Winnipeg Free Press, March 9, quoted in Raz, “Alone
again,” 389.
30
Raz, “Alone again,” 390.
31
A-Type Hallucinations are simple in nature (flashes of light, shapes, etc.), while B-Type are more complex
(integrated or animated sensation/perceptions) – Zuckerman, “Hallucinations,” 94.
32
Marvin Zuckerman, “Hallucinations, Reported sensations, and Images,” in Sensory Deprivation: Fifteen Years of
Research, ed. John P. Zubek (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 95.
27
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subjects reported “some form of hallucinatory activity”, as well as a general lack of control over
the hallucinations and an inability to start or end them33. In this experiment,
[the images] were often quite vivid and could not be terminated at will. Only three of the
subjects believed that the phenomena were "real" and produced by outside sources. There
was considerable movement in the RVSs34. The onset of the sensations varied from 20
minutes to about 70 hours. Some subjects did not report them until they became very
compelling, and four subjects did not report them until the experiment was completed.35
In Heron et al. (1956), the 3 experimenters put themselves under perceptual deprivation for 6 days.
They experienced what can be described as an escalating effect of PD. After one day, they reported
simple visual disturbances such as dots and patterns to more complex experiences (i.e.
scenery and people). After 6 days of isolation, they found they experienced a variety of
visual disturbances including apparent movement of objects in the visual field, apparent
movement associated with head/eye movements, distortions of shape, accentuation of after
images and effects on the perception of colour and contrast.36
Now let us consider some of the findings of the Zubek phase. In 1964, he published a paper titled
“Behavioral Changes After Prolonged Perceptual Deprivation (No Intrusions)”. In it, he concluded,
after running a perceptual isolation experiment for a week, that “increasing the severity of
perceptual deprivation above that of our earlier experiments did not affect the incidence of
hallucinations and post-isolation distortions of the perceptual environment. Both phenomena were
rare”37. The stark contradiction between this and the findings from the McGill experiments and
Heron et al. (1956) might throw the reader off, until Zubek maintains, one page later, that “[t]his
discrepancy in results may be due to two procedural differences. First, our Ss wore no gauntlet-

33

Woodburn Heron, “Cognitive and Physiological Effects of Perceptual isolation,” in Sensory Deprivation: A
Symposium Held at Harvard Medical School, ed. P. Solomon et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 16-17.
34
RVS is short for Reported Visual Sensations and RAS is short for Reported Auditory sensations. This is different
from RAS which is short for Reticular activating system which will be discussed later on.
35
Zuckerman, “Hallucinations,” 96
36
Donna M Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis of sensory phenomena induced by perceptual
deprivation," Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11, no. 1 (2012): 97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-0119233-z
37
John P Zubek, "Behavioral changes after prolonged perceptual deprivation (no intrusions)." Perceptual and Motor
Skills 18, no. 2 (1964): 413.
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type gloves and hence received more tactile stimulation than did the McGill Ss. Second, our
procedure involved occasional intrusions with visual test material in which the translucent goggles
were briefly removed”38. One here must ask the reason why the title had “no intrusions”, while a
page later the experimenter admits to clear intrusions which would facilitate the subjects with
sufficient sensory stimulation. In earlier experiments, Zubek and others were also able to report
that “[v]isual sensations of the simple A variety were more frequent in the SD condition while the
more complex, type B RVS's were rare or absent in both conditions”39. Before we comment on the
clear contradiction between Zubek’s and The McGill Uni’s findings, let us take a look at the
modern phase.
In 2011, Lloyd et al. conducted a perceptual deprivation experiment on 31 undergraduate
psychology students who were required to listen to white noise for 30 minutes while wearing
goggles. The subjects relayed their experiences into a Dictaphone as they experienced them, which
eliminated any delay in reporting. They reported that “[c]omplex auditory experiences were the
most commonly reported perceptions” 40 . Their analysis, which contains a good deal of
phenomenological description, revealed two key characteristics of the hallucinations: their spatial
character (being out-there in the world instead of in the subject’s mind), and “the perceiver’s role
as an active contributor to the experience”41. They explicitly stated that “the increase in spatial
information allowed the participant to communicate more ‘meaning’ in the reported sensation and
was therefore more similar to ‘Type B’ phenomena” 42 . This is in contrast to the subjects’
perceptions of simple sensory variations which lacked meaning given the subjects attempt to relay

38

Zubek, "Behavioral changes,” 414. [emphasis added]
Zuckerman, “Variables,” 51.
40
Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 100.
41
Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 101.
42
Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 102.
39
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their experience without attaching them to something external 43 . This allows us to make the
tentative assumption that meaning requires the externality of the stimuli.
In a 2004 visual deprivation experiment, Merabet et. al. reported that 10 out of 13 subjects,
who had been blindfolded for 5 days, reported both simple and complex hallucinations, resulting
in a conclusion that “rapid and complete visual deprivation is sufficient to induce visual
hallucinations in normal subjects”44. This is in contrast to Zubek’s conclusion earlier that type B
hallucination were rare in both PD and SD. Another very important distinction from the Zubek
experiment is that the subjects in Merabet et. al. reported no hallucinatory experiences “during
periods of tactile stimulation such as Braille reading instruction or during fMRI sessions”45. This
might clarify the reason why Zubek found hallucinations to be rare in his experiments given the
sensory input which his subjects received periodically.
On the wider spectrum of inducing psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) 46 in normal
population under sensory deprivation, Daniel et al. (2014) stated that “[i]n the modern era, several
studies have attempted to use a sensory deprivation paradigm to induce PLEs in the normal
population. Using more modern techniques, all studies were successful in inducing hallucinations
of varying complexity in many of the participants”47. And in 2015, Daniel and Mason developed
a model to predict PLEs during sensory deprivation. In both experiments, the conclusion indicated
that sensory deprivation can be standardized as a low-risk non-pharmacological successful method

43

Lloyd et al., "A qualitative analysis,” 102.
Lotfi B. Merabet et al., "Visual hallucinations during prolonged blindfolding in sighted subjects," Journal of NeuroOphthalmology 24, no. 2 (2004): 109.
45
Merabet et al., "Visual hallucinations,” 110.
46
Psychotic experiences “generally refers to subthreshold forms of hallucinations and delusions”; although this
definition is not standardized. – Yung, Alison R., and Ashleigh Lin. "Psychotic experiences and their
significance." World Psychiatry 15, no. 2 (2016): 130.
47
Christina Daniel et al., "Psychotic-like experiences and their cognitive appraisal under short-term sensory
deprivation," Frontiers in psychiatry 5 (2014): 2.
44

11

of inducing PLEs 48 , 49 . This, again, is in contradiction to Zubek’s remarks on the rarity of
hallucinations.
A pattern starts to emerge: The results from the modern phase have been consistently in
line with those from the McGill University phase, and both stand in contrast to Zubek’s phase.
This is due to the different motivations behind the three phases. The McGill University phase’s
concern with brainwashing lead to more strict conditions of sensory restriction which resembled
the conditions of the modern phase, while Zubek’s concern with the practical utilization of sensory
restriction has led to looser conditions. This is not to argue that Zubek’s research was not
important; of course, it is. However, this is to argue that standardizing Zubek’s results as a way to
contradict the McGill University results and thus play down the effects of sensory restriction50,
which has seemed as a shared sentiment among the authors in his edited book, Sensory
Deprivation: Fifteen Years of Research, was a mistaken judgment. Let us now identify what
exactly are we looking for in the three phases.

Section III: High and Low Ends of Sensory Restriction
Finding commonalities between the three phases is an impossible task given the vastness of the
literature. However, what we can determine are the high and low ends of the spectrum of effects
attributed to sensory restriction and see how they affect consciousness. If we are able to prove that,
in both the low and high points on the spectrum of sensory restriction effects, inward thinking is
not possible, then all the spectrum in between these two points will abide by their character. Think

48

Daniel et al., “Psychotic-like experiences,” 7.
Christina Daniel, and Oliver J. Mason. "Predicting psychotic-like experiences during sensory deprivation." BioMed
research international 2015 (2015): 8.
50
The difference in motivation lead to a difference in the experiments set up, which in turn lead to a drastic difference
in results. Understandably, the historical context of the Zubek’s phase is critical to the understanding of the deeper
motivations of framing and adjusting the work to that particular end. For an in-depth look into this historical context,
please refer to Raz (2013).
49
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of the features of the two ends as the necessary features of a larger set, then every subset would
have to include these necessary features in order to belong to this larger set. All that would remain
is formulate our understanding of the nature of consciousness in light of the current data. With that
out of the way, let us look at what we take to be the low and high ends of effects under sensory
restriction51, i.e. veridical somatic sensation and hallucinations.
1. The Low End
Under SD, subjects experience an increase in somesthetic sensation. It is believed that this is due
to the fact that somesthetic sensation is the least restricted modality and thus it occupies more of
the subject’s field of attention in the absence of stimulation52. Under SD conditions, stress and
other associated isolation effects have been linked to the subjects’ recumbent position rather than
a reduction in “the over-all level of sensory stimulation” 53 . Nonetheless, multiple results did
support the hypothesis that “SD increases sensitivity to somesthetic stimuli because of a lack of
competition from exteroceptive stimuli”, making it easier for somesthetic stimulation to occupy a
larger portion of the subjects’ attention54.
This continuous somesthetic stimulation, i.e. bodily discomfort, can be credited with
stimulating the mind enough to constitute responding to a bodily presence which prevents the
environment from being completely sensory restrictive. Lloyd et al. also agrees that “[p]erceptual
deprivation is easier to control experimentally and does not produce the unwanted effects of social
isolation or physical discomfort that sensory deprivation often can” 55 . Furthermore, in tests
performed after the fact, SD alone affected recollection and recognition, without affecting speech

51

The low end represents the least intense activity recorded under sensory restriction, and the high end represents the
most intense.
52
Zuckerman, “Variables,” 53.
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or abstract thinking, while PD alone was linked to reduction in “numerical facility, verbal fluency,
and abstract reasoning”56; which led to the conclusion that “PD seems to produce a more extensive
cognitive and perceptual impairment than SD”57.
Nonetheless, bodily stimulation under PD conditions has actually proved to be beneficial
for subjects. In a 1963 experiment, Zubek found that “physical exercises during PD resulted in
significantly less impairment in intellectual and perceptual motor tests, and less EEG change than
in PD subjects, not required to exercise during the one-week period”58. Granted, however, that
two-third of the subjects who underwent exercise quit before the end of the week, just like the nonexercise SD and PD groups, which indicates that the threshold for tolerance is crossed, despite the
fact that exercise seemed to alleviate the effects of PD. Another positive effect of stimulation, this
time under SD, is that, after a 3-day session, “[t]he post SD results tend to indicate that the SD
subjects were benefiting from the learning during SD even though it was not reflected in their
performance during SD”59.
This indicates that the intervention of physical stimulation in sensory restriction can help
the subject perform better in learning related activities. And if physical stimulation can provides
the subject with sufficient stimulation to maintain a coherent level of thinking, then that lends
support to the idea that bodily discomfort under SD has its own set of introduced effects which
prevent the experience from being completely isolated; meaning that, there can be no completely
sensory restricted experiment since, even in cases of strict SD, subjects tend to use their body as a
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means for self-stimulation. As Zuckerman puts it, “confinement to a bed in a small cubicle for 8
hours produces generalized stress relative to a normal environment”60.
We can here determine that inward thinking, in the low end of sensory restriction, does not
occur since thinking under these circumstances is accompanied by sensations of bodily discomfort
which produce a constant source of stimulation 61 , which are accompanied with phenomenal
character.
2. The High End
The high end which we identify here is hallucination. In Heron (1961), hallucinations were
reported to have lasted for up to 70 hours. Additionally, “[a] number of studies have demonstrated
that the reported visual sensations show a progression toward increasingly more complex and
meaningful ones. The subjects first report diffuse blobs; then geometrical forms; then patterns;
then objects; and, finally, integrated, animated scenes”62. Similarly, in Lloyd et al., “[t]hematic
analysis of the data revealed there was a progression of spatiality in the phenomena reported during
perceptual deprivation from noticing simple abstract variations in the stimulus array to fully
immersive perceptions of complex multisensory events in the environment”63. Hallucinations are
taken up as the high end of sensory restriction since they constitute consciousness’ attempt at
positing a world when the subject’s connection with the world is disturbed. To understand this
more, we need to take a deeper look into hallucinations.
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Section IV: The Neuroscience of Hallucinations
1. On the Nature of Hallucination
We will begin this section not with the philosophical debate, but with the neurological data at hand.
In his discussion of visual hallucinations in patients with Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS) 64 ,
Dominic H. Ffytche differentiates between mind’s eye, as the inner world, and eye’s mind
(henceforth referred to as physical eye, to eliminate confusion), referring to the world around us.
He maintains that specializations of brain regions resulted in the two taking place at different
spatial points in the brain. While mind’s eye corresponded to activity in the “frontal, parietal and
medial temporal cortex”, the physical eye corresponded to activity in “specialized visual cortical
regions” 65 . Interestingly, during hallucination, “[a]ctivity changes invariably occurred within
[physical eye], not mind’s eye, regions, the content of a hallucination relating to the specialization
of the eye’s mind region activated”66,67. This was also supported by Santhouse et al. (2000). They
were able to determine, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), that “visual
hallucinations [in CBS population] were related to phasic increases in activity within specialized
visual cortex and that the location of the increases defined the type of experience reported”68. This
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means that, if the brain region responsible for processing faces was active during hallucination,
then subjects experienced face hallucinations, and if the brain region responsible for processing
color was active during hallucination, then subjects experienced color hallucinations, and so on.
This means that the subject’s visual hallucinatory experience occurs in the same brain
region that is responsible for visual perception, and not the isolated region of the mind’s eye where
imagination takes place69. Here, the reader may claim that since imagination occurs in a different
brain region, then that may indicate a form of inward thinking which can persist on its own. To
that we say, we are not attempting to disprove the claim that there are exclusive brain regions
which are responsible for thinking, of which we take imagination to be a form of, and which more
or less occur away, though not separate, from perceptual systems. However, we have two
arguments against this hypothesis of stand-alone imagination: one from brain activity under
sensory restriction, the other from the perceptual nature of the hallucinatory experience.
2. The Argument from Brain Activity
Researchers observed a progressive decline in brain activity in long-term isolation accompanied
with an increasing arousal in “skin conductance and body movement”70. One explanation here is
that when the cerebral cortical-reticular, particularly the ascending reticular activating
system (ARAS), fails to activate the brain given the deficiency of sensory input, there occurs an
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“efferent discharge which creates the neurophysiological equivalent of increased ‘drive’”, which
accounts for the “increase in autonomic and adrenocortical71 activity”72. This can explain how the
body enters a state of self-stimulation under SD in order to maintain its touch with the world.
Accordingly, even in cases of no hallucination, imagination would not persist on its own given the
automatic response from ARAS to the lack of stimulation which produces bodily sensations that
occupies the subject’s perception. This gives further support to our initial demonstration that there
is no biological possibility for a completely sensory restricted experience and shuts the door on
stand-alone imagination.
3. The Argument from Binding, or the Perceptual Nature of Hallucinatory
Experiences
As Revonsuo and Newman (1999) put it, “[t]he binding problem is, basically, the problem of how
the unity of conscious perception is brought about by the distributed activities of the central
nervous system” 73 . This involves two main issues: segregation and combination. Segregation
refers to the brain’s ability to segregate distinct elements within a complex sensory input,
combination refers to the brain’s ability to present such a divers and complex sensory input as a
single experience. Two main camps emerge as central to the debate.
In the first camp, focused more on answering the combination question, Crick and Koch
(1990) argue that binding is what generates the conscious experience, and in the second camp,
which is focused more on the segregation question, Zeki and Bartels (1999)74 introduce the idea
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that binding is a post-conscious phenomenon75 , which is then formalized in Zeki (2007). The
difference between the two camps is that for the first, if binding generates consciousness, then to
accurately perceive a yellow square, processing of the color yellow and the shape square must
either occur at the same time t, or there must be some place in the brain where the output from the
processing of color and shape are bound. Their solution to the problem is to suggest that one of
consciousness’ functions “is to present76 the result of various underlying computations”77 and that
this involves “an attentional mechanism that temporarily binds the relevant neurons together by
synchronizing their spikes in 40 Hz oscillations”78, and that “objects for which the binding problem
has been solved are placed into working memory”79.
However, what makes the theory of the second camp appealing is the fact that since the
brain has distinct regions for the processing of different elements of the perceptual experience, or
what we can refer to as spatial asynchrony in the processing of perceptual data, the processing time
in each region differs from other regions, which suggests a temporal asynchrony in the processing
of perceptual data. Experiments show that “[c]olor is perceived before motion by ~80 ms”, and
“locations are perceived before colors, which are perceived before orientations” 80 . Moreover,
because of this difference in the time it takes to perceive different elements of a perceptual
experience, “subjects consistently mis-bind the color perceived at time t to the motion perceived at
75
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time t-1”81 . This means that the theory of the first camp, that “objects for which the binding
problem has been solved are placed into working memory” is mistaken. Alternatively, what Zeki
proposed to account for such spatial and temporal asynchrony is that when the brain attempts to
bind together all the input from the different modalities, it “does not wait for each area to complete
its processings; rather it simply binds what has been processed and reached a perceptual level”82.
This translates to: perception as processing is itself a kind of consciousness, while binding as the
conscious surface connection of the perceptual input from two or more modalities is postconscious. In layman terms: you already know what you saw before you knew you saw it83. The
two types of consciousness, and the two types of knowledge, will be discussed in detail in the
coming chapters.
Furthermore, Zeki maintains that there exists no “mechanism to compensate for the
perceptual time differences between [the brain’s] specialized systems”, nor is there “a final
‘ perception area ’, equipped with a ‘ synchronizer ’, which would receive information from all the
different systems and bind it in the appropriate spatiotemporal way”84,85. Thus, it is “not surprising
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that there is no terminal station in the cortex, since activity at each node represents, in a sense, a
terminal stage of its own specialized process”86.
Here’s an attempt to make more precise Zeki’s argument: since
-

the processing sites in the visual brain are also perceptual sites; meaning they do not
need further processing in higher brain centers for recognition to occur87,88, and

-

it has been demonstrated that there exists a temporal asynchrony in the processing of
perceptual data89,

Then that strongly suggest that “binding is a post-conscious phenomenon”90. Moreover, Zeki’s
argument received support from the findings of Zmigrod & Hommel (2010) who reported that
“binding effects were entirely unrelated to conscious perception”91,92. The main argument they
were trying to test is the assumption of Treisman (2003) that “feature integration is a necessary
precondition for coherent conscious perception”93 – the same assumption which Crick & Koch
adopted. The task they set out to investigate is whether the probability that feature binding occurs
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is correlated with “the probability of perceiving the bound features as belonging to the same
perceptual event, or, more specifically, as occurring at the same time” 94 . Consistent with the
findings from Zeki (2003), they found no such correlation, which suggested that intermodal feature
binding has nothing to do with perception of multi-modal features as belonging to the same event95.
In other words, these findings suggest that “conscious experience of unity is not a prerequisite for,
or a direct consequence of binding”96.
If we add to this Ffytche demonstration that hallucination occurs in the same brain regions
responsible for visual processing, then we see no reason for binding to treat hallucinations as
anything but cognitions97 since their perception has occurred already where they are processed.
And if we take the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience to be the combination of all
attributes of the perceptual experience which have been processed at time t, i.e. the phenomenal
character as the result of binding, then hallucinations too have a phenomenal character. This runs
counter to the disjunctivist view which states that “when one is hallucinating one’s experience
lacks phenomenal character altogether”98,99.
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Conclusion
To this point, we have argued two things: first, that in the low end of sensory restriction, inward
thinking does not occur since thinking is accompanied by sensations – which constitute an element
of the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience, and second, that in the high end of sensory
restriction, inward thinking does not occur since thinking is accompanied by cognitions – which
constitute an element of the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience. Thus, there exists no
thinking without a phenomenal character involved in it.
What this also means, is that for consciousness to continue its wakeful manifestation,
thought as we identified it earlier, it needs to keep a certain level of stimulation going – ranging
from bodily sensations to a full positing of a world in hallucination – in order to have something
to attach thought to. In other words, consciousness is not only stimuli-receiving but also a stimuliseeking 100 , and sometimes stimuli-generating, machine. By this, we take it that we have
demonstrated that: all thinking involves an underlying phenomenal character giving how
consciousness is a stimuli-seeking machine.

Anticipating Criticism: Neuroplasticity as a Counter Argument
A counter argument can be made by utilizing neuroplasticity. What neuroplasticity means is the
brains ability to change its structure to optimize the flow of information. A case can be made that,
under prolonged sensory deprivation, the brain can start rewiring itself to ensure resuming its
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normal functions. Of course, we do not disagree with the idea since it has been empirically proven,
however, we contest using it as an argument for the possibility of inward thinking. Consider the
1981 study by D. A. Winfield on “the effects of postnatal visual deprivation on synaptic density
in the visual cortex”101 . In this study, Winfield sutured “the eyelids over one eye in 6 kittens and
over both eyes in 4 kittens”, under ether anaesthesia, shortly before the natural time of eyeopening102. The interesting results came from the bilaterally visually deprived kittens. Their early
synaptogenesis paralleled that of normal kittens, and their synaptic density was slightly below
average after 40 days, and by the age of 70 days, their synaptic density deteriorated to 26% below
average. Interestingly, however, unlike the control group who started synaptic pruning normally
at the age of 70, the bilaterally restricted kittens showed a slow increase in synaptic density up to
13% above normal by the age of 110 days, and even showed a 22% increase compared to control
animals after reaching maturity. This shows that “synaptic pruning is indeed influenced by
environmental input”, and that “that immature visual cortex, deprived of its normal input from the
eyes, develops other afferent connections, including somatosensory ones, which form functioning
systems”103.
Moreover, other researchers reported that, in visually restricted kittens, neurons fail to
respond to any visual stimuli, “although they are ‘spontaneously’ active”104, despite the fact that
“behaviorally, these animals appear blind when the opaque lenses are removed”105. Keep in mind
that neuroplasticity goes both ways, which means that, these kittens, when later are consistently
introduced to normal visual stimuli, “some degree of recovery of vision over time does occur even
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when bilateral visual deprivation extends from birth to maturity”106. The interesting question here
is: if these neurons continue firing without responding to stimuli, what kind of connections did
they develop? “Might they have been recruited for functions other than visual?”107. There is a
suggestion that the answer to that question is affirmative, since “inputs from the visual cortex to
the suprasylvian association cortex are replaced by increased auditory and somatosensory
inputs”108. Behavioral testing of the animals showed an “improved sound localization” compared
to control animals, which suggests that these adaptations are functionally significant.
What this attempts to show is that neuroplasticity is actively attempting to optimize neural
connection to receive the best possible quality of stimuli from the environment, and when it is
unable to do so, it rewires the brain to divert resources in order to enhance the quality of feedback.
And when the reason for the deprivation is removed, the brain attempts to wire back the
connections to keep the feedback from the previously restricted modality flowing. Accordingly,
we can conclude that the brain does whatever at its power to ensure that the connection with
worldly stimuli is optimal, which gives further supports to our claim that the nature of
consciousness is outwardly.
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Chapter II: On Phenomenal Concepts
In the previous chapter, we argued that all thinking always involves Phenomenal Character given
that the nature of consciousness is being outwardly. Towards proving the truth of this proposition,
we presented Zeki’s micro-consciousness theory and concluded that since binding is a postconscious phenomenon, and since the perception as processing of stimuli itself is conscious, then
the perceiver already knows what they saw before they know they saw it. We will refer to this type
of knowledge as consisting of phenomenal concepts and will discuss in a minute where that term
comes from. In this chapter, we want to take a deeper look at this knowledge claim, i.e. that there
exists a type of knowledge of the world that is strictly phenomenal. Towards that end, we will need
to answer, first, what is the nature of phenomenal concepts? (The Epistemic Question), second,
are phenomenal concepts their own distinct category? do they really exist? (The Ontological
Question), and third, to what extent do phenomenal concepts exert control over behavior? (The
Behavioral Question). This part of the thesis will attempt at arguing the soundness of the second
proposition which states that all phenomenal character involves phenomenal concepts. Before we
begin to answer the epistemic question, a prologue is necessarily due.

Prologue: A/P Consciousness
Based on the work of Daniel Schacter, Ned Block proposes a theory of consciousness according
to which there are, in fact, two kinds of consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness (PConsciousness) and Access Consciousness (A-Consciousness). Here’s how Block envisions it: PConsciousness is “experience,” or more precisely, following Thomas Nagel, “what makes a state
phenomenally conscious is that there is something ‘it is like’ […] to be in that state” 109 , i.e.
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something it is like to experience the redness of a specific bottle in this room under this lighting..
The function of P-Consciousness, according to Block, is to act as “the gateway between the special
purpose ‘knowledge’ modules and the central Executive System that is in charge of direct control
of reasoning, reporting, and guiding action”110. The operation of P-Consciousness as a gateway
involves “integrating the outputs of the specialized modules and transmitting the integrated
contents to mechanisms of reasoning and control of action and reporting”111; the latter mechanisms
are understood to be part of A-Consciousness. A state “is access-conscious roughly speaking if its
content—what is represented by the perceptual state—is processed via that information-processing
function, that is, if its content gets to the Executive System, whereby it can be used to control
reasoning and behavior”112.
It is important to note here that Zeki credits Block for the distinction between micro and
macro-consciousnesses stating that “[m]icro- and macro-consciousnesses with their individual
temporal hierarchies really refer to what has been coined as phenomenal consciousness, as opposed
to access consciousness” 113 . P-Consciousness is similar to Zeki’s understanding of binding.
Binding occurs after the specialized ‘knowledge’ modules, which Zeki calls essential nodes, have
already processed the stimuli and are ready to relay the information to the higher areas of the brain,
which are the mechanisms of reasoning and control of action and reporting. Now that we have
established the distinction between the two types of consciousness, we turn to ask our first
question: what is the nature of this knowledge generated by phenomenal character?
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Section I: The Epistemic Question
-

The purpose of this section is to propose the Blockian vision of the nature of phenomenal
concepts and argue that the meaning of phenomenal concepts depends, in part, on the effect
of the phenomenal character of the experience on a subject. This is based on Block’s
hypothesis that information travel from the specialized modules to A-consciousness
through P-consciousness.

In his rebutting of the Property Dualism Argument, Block introduced the idea of a phenomenal
concept. A phenomenal concept is “individuated with respect to fundamental uses that involve the
actual occurrence of phenomenal properties. In these fundamental uses, a simultaneously
occurring experience is used to think about that very experience. No one could have a phenomenal
concept if they could not in some way relate the concept to such fundamental uses in which the
subject actually has a simultaneous instance of the phenomenal quality”114. Note that a phenomenal
concept should be distinguished from what we will call a linguistic symbolic concept. A symbolic
concept does not rely directly on the actual occurrence of a certain phenomenal quality, yet may
involves a multiplicity of phenomenal concepts. It relies fundamentally on the Executive system’s
operations of information-processing, which makes it primarily A-Conscious despite, like every
other A-operation, relying on P-Consciousness.
This idea of a phenomenal concept allows him to argue against the Property Dualism,
argued for by Frank Jackson, who claimed that Mary115 would know something different when she
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experiences the color red for the first time. Rather than her learning a new “property” of the color
red, Block argues that “the new knowledge acquired does not show that there are any properties
beyond the physical properties” since, in personal encounter of the color red, there exists only “a
new concept but no new properties or facts” 116 , i.e. a new way of conceiving of red. Block
continues to say that the manner in which Mary would express what she learned about the
phenomenal concept of seeing the color red is something like: “Oh, so this is what it is like to see
red”117, where the italicized ‘this’ would refer to what we arbitrarily call ‘redness’.
However, since P-consciousness is the binding of the information relayed from the
specialized modules regarding a perceptual experience, and A-consciousness involves the
mechanisms of reasoning and control of action and reporting, then Mary’s reporting on the
phenomenal concept of ‘redness’ is actually not the true expression of the phenomenal concept
itself, but rather a translation of the phenomenal concept into a linguistic symbolic concept through
engaging the reporting aspect of A-consciousness. That is to say, that the true expression of the
phenomenal concept is incommunicable. This is precisely the reason why it is impossible to
explain redness to a blind person: we can communicate the linguistic symbolic concept with the
word-token ‘red’, but we cannot communicate the phenomenal concept about the phenomenal
character of a definite redness. Block himself seems to have something similar in mind when he
explains that, “[i]n the case of language-using organisms such as ourselves, a major symptom of

happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn
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access-consciousness would be reportability”

118

, and since phenomenal concepts are

incommunicable, then what is communicable must be another type of concepts, i.e. symbolic.
Now, since both the phenomenal content and concept are interlinked given the condition
of actual occurrence which guarantees their simultaneous generation, and if the phenomenal
concept of a definite redness is instantiated from the phenomenal character of experiencing a
definite color red, then the meaning of the phenomenal concept of redness should depend, in part119,
on the effect of the phenomenal character of experiencing the color red. The question here is: what
would be the effect of the phenomenal character of experiencing the color red? Remember that in
the first chapter we identified phenomenal character roughly as any subjective experience under
the threshold of an explicitly propositional thought, including sensations, cognitions, etc. But since
cognitions are under the control of internal mental processes, and since it is impossible to account
for any propositional thought at any given time by way other than reportability—which would
translate the P-conscious into an A-conscious state—the only thing we can account for of a
phenomenal character qua phenomenal character is feelings. Any feeling must involve a correlate
activity from the sympathetic nervous system as an involuntary reaction of the body to external
stimulation, be it a perceptual experience – e.g. the color red or a cardinal stimulus, or direct
sensation – e.g. the sensation of pain. The sympathetic nervous system, which is part of the larger
autonomic nervous system, releases the appropriate chemicals in order to induce the correlative
feeling—a process that happens automatically. Accordingly, we can claim that one of the areas
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where we can measure that phenomenal character is the emotional effect the color has over the
subject. The question now becomes, how do we measure such effect?
In a 1994 study by Patricia Valdez and Albert Mehrabian, they were able to determine that,
antithetical to brighter colors, darker colors were linked to lower pleasure (P), higher arousal (A)
and higher dominance-inducing (D)120; or to put it concisely: “Brightness = +P -A -D, Darkness =
-P +A +D”121. At the same time, other research that provided measures of aggression and anger
based on the same parameters of pleasure, arousal and dominance, arrived at the following values:
“Aggression = -.36 P +.20 A +.28 D, Anger = -.74 P +.36 A +.09 D”. By correlating these results,
Valdez and Mehrabian concluded that “darker colors are likely to elicit feelings that are similar to
(or weaker variants of) anger, hostility, or aggression. Darker colors are also expected to elicit
feelings that constitute components of aggression, anger, or hostility (e.g., displeasure, high
arousal, or dominance)”122. Now, while maintaining the condition of actual occurrence, and if we
now take the meaning of a phenomenal concept to depend in part on the effect of phenomenal
character, then we can claim that in perceiving a darker color, the phenomenal character of that
perceptual experience would include feelings of arousal and dominance, while the phenomenal
concept that manifests inches towards anger, hostility, or aggression, or elicit feelings of
displeasure, high arousal, or dominance.
The counterargument here might go along these lines: feelings as involuntary sympathetic
nervous system reactions are not accompanied with any phenomenal concepts, but only
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phenomenal characters that are accompanied by concepts. Each category, phenomenal characters
and concepts, is distinct on its own and there’s no overlap between the two. The idea that is
generated in someone’s stream of consciousness when they see red is the same as when they think
red. To answer these potential disagreements, we now turn to try and answer our ontological
question.

Section II: The Ontological Question: Two Possible Routes
-

So far, we’ve argued that part of the meaning of a phenomenal concept is the phenomenal
character a perceptual experience has over the subject. What this might suggest is a
deflationary approach where it might be argued that phenomenal concepts are just feelings,
or an eliminative approach whereby phenomenal concepts are denied altogether. The
purpose of this section is to argue for the existence of phenomenal concepts as their distinct
category of concepts and to refute the attempt to collapse phenomenal concepts into
phenomenal character or deny their existence. The idea is to showcase a special type of
direct connection between the specialized modules and A-consciousness in the case in
which there is no P-consciousness which allows the executive system to guess (or vaguely
discriminate) information about certain stimuli, despite the information not passing
through, or registering any feelings, in P-consciousness. We believe this is a common
mistake since guessing and certainty are two different epistemic modes which should not
be conflated.

To answer our question here, we need to untangle phenomenal concepts and phenomenal contents.
That is to say, we need to find cases in which, on the one hand, a stimulus has no phenomenal
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character while, on the other, a phenomenal concept can be observed taking part in rational
behavior.
We have seen in the previous chapter how Zeki utilizes the temporal discrepancy in processing
certain stimuli to argue his case for micro-consciousness. Zeki’s method does not allow us to
investigate each of them separately. On the other hand, Block’s hypothesis allows us to do exactly
that. Block presented his hypothesis in light of a discussion of patients with damage to their
primary visual cortex which results in blind areas in their visual field. When presented with a
stimulus—say a vertical line—in their blind field, the patients deny having any representation of
that stimulus. Remarkably, some blindsight patients, despite having no A-conscious representation
of the stimulus, “are able to ‘guess’ reliably about certain features of the stimulus, features having
to do with motion, location, direction”123, allowing them to discriminate certain forms without
having an A-conscious representation of the stimulus. We will first present Block’s explanation of
the phenomenon, then our hypothesis of how we think this process occurs.
1. The Specialized Module Route
The explanation Block provides is that the specialized module responsible for processing the
stimuli “has some information about the verticality of the stimulus”124, or, as Zeki would put it,
has already processed the stimulus. Block maintains that, in the case of a blindsight patient,
The pathways between this specialized module and the phenomenal consciousness system
have been damaged, creating the ‘blind field,’ so the patient has no phenomenally
conscious experience of the line, and hence his Executive System has no information about
whether the line is vertical or horizontal. But the specialized module has a direct
connection to the Response System, so when the subject is given a binary choice, the
specialized module can somehow directly affect the response.125,126
123
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Notice here how Block contradicts his own condition of information traveling from the specialized
module to P-consciousness and then to A-consciousness. Instead, he proposes here that
information which is sufficient for recognition but are not available for the free use of reasoning
can yet directly affect behavior, by traveling directly to the response system, bypassing both Pand A-consciousness. Thus, he argues, “when a representation is not conscious—as in the
blindsight patient’s blindfield perceptual representations—it can influence behavior behind the
scenes, but only when the representation is conscious does it play a rational role.”127.
However, there is an issue with Block’s proposal of taking the route of the specialized
module as being able to “somehow” affect the response of the blindsight patient. That issue is
coming from Block himself, whom we quoted earlier as saying that “[i]n the case of languageusing organisms such as ourselves, a major symptom of access-consciousness would be
reportability” 128 . If reportability is a major symptom of access-consciousness, how can
reportability, at the same time, be considered as mere behavior and not a rational response? How
can voluntary speech, which is the most elaborate manifestation of A-conscious rationality, come
under the control of a single specialized module? Even more puzzling, would any specialized
module be able to take control over any response system at any moment? What if two specialized
modules are sending urgent contradictory information at the same time? Shouldn’t Pconsciousness act as a moderator, since already one of its functions is “integrating the outputs of
the specialized modules”?
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Hypothetically, for this to be correct, this would need a case where there is an observable
effect of a specific specialized module over a specific splanchnic nerve, leading to a specific bodily
reaction. And even then, P-consciousness would need to act as the link and regulator between
different information coming from different specialized modules and the responses to trigger.
Surely, the specialized modules can have a say regarding the urgency of a certain stimulus—think
of a ball hurling towards your face—yet it would still require binding in order for the information
to be integrated to make sure other modules are not reporting a more urgent stimulus – say
reporting pain from your foot caught on fire.
The questions do not stop here 129 , despite the fact that this method is clearly highly
speculative. Nevertheless, in order to do justice to Block’s view, let us look at an argument that
can be in favor of what he presents. Consider Wernicke’s speech aphasia, where
language output is fluent – that is, normal in mean phrase length, generally sentence-length,
and using all grammatical elements available in the language. Content may be extremely
paraphasic or empty. Paraphasic speech conforms to the general rules of the language but
contains substitutions at the phonemic level (phonemic paraphasias such as smoon for
spoon), the word level (semantic paraphasias such as cup for spoon), or entirely novel but
phonologically legal words (neologisms such as snopel)130.
This type of aphasia is associated with damage to the superior temporal gyrus with more severe
effects if the damage extends to middle and interior temporal gyri131. Wernicke’s aphasia requires
damage to all three regions specifically because, despite the fact that cross-modal semantic
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knowledge emerges from multiple regions in the posterior association cortex, “available evidence
highlights the inferior temporal and middle temporal/angular gyrus transition as the particularly
key regions for word retrieval”.132
The reason we are bringing up Wernicke’s aphasia here is that this is a case where the
speech (response) module which is responsible for semantic formulation is having trouble
translating the orders from the executive system into produced speech. This type of aphasia is not
associated with cognitive issues on the level of formulating ideas, but only on the level of
producing the correct counterparts to these ideas in semantic form. This means that, in this case,
the executive system does not have total authority over speech production, allowing for the speech
module itself to determine the content of the speech produced (albeit still relatively similar to that
dictated by the executive system). On these lines, one could argue that in the case of the blindsight
patient being shown a vertical line, the executive system, albeit without physical damage to the
temporal gyrus, could, in theory, delegate the responsibility of the response to the response module,
which turns to the specialized module responsible for processing shapes to arrive at the correct
answer regarding whether the line is horizontal or vertical. This, however, will need to entail the
assumption that speech itself can be understood as part of the involuntary response system of the
body. There can be an argument for that, given that in thinking what we speak, we do not stop to
think about the language we speak it through. A counter view to that would be based on the
understanding that language takes advantage of the multimodality of the sensory-motor system,
states that there exists “no single ‘module’ for language—and that human language makes use of
mechanisms also present in nonhuman primates”133.
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Our aim here is not to outright argue against Block’s vision, especially since we believe it
can work in certain cases. Yet we find it unconvincing in answering the question: how could there
be accurate reporting on a specific feature of a stimulus which cannot be seen? Block offers little
more than claiming that “the specialized module can somehow directly affect the response” 134.
What we want to provide here is an alternative route that shows how information in the specialized
module can affect rational behavior without registering a phenomenal character at all, essentially
arguing for the existence of phenomenal concepts. We now turn to the second route.
2. The Phenomenal Concept Route
Our proposed argument for the nature of the operation by which blindsight patients are able
to successfully guess simple facts regarding stimuli will depend on the truth of three premises. We
will proceed by presenting the evidence we have for the truth of each of the premises, followed by
our conclusion.
o Premise 1: The Nature of Concepts
In their book Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson operate within the
parameters of the understanding that reasoning by means of concepts requires that “the neural
structures of the brain carry out that reasoning”135. On their understanding of embodiment, “the
same neural system engaged in perception (or in bodily movement) plays a central role in
conception”136,137. They propose what they call “primary metaphors” as the vehicles of mental
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representations used for thinking. A primary metaphor “allows conventional mental imagery from
sensorimotor domains to be used for domains of subjective experience”, such as when we conceive
that failure to understand something can be associated with it flying over our heads, or that “prices
rose” is understood in the same manner as “more is up” which is “a subjective judgment of quantity
[that] is conceptualized in terms of the sensorimotor experience of verticality”138 . Christopher
Johnson hypothesizes that, in early development, the concepts of verticality and quantity are
conflated with one another. Later on, the concepts are separated, yet are connected by “a crossdomain mapping between the sensorimotor concept of verticality (the source domain) and the
subjective judgment of quantity”139.
Christopher Johnson studied the utterances recorded over the course of the language
development of a child named Shem. In his analysis, Johnson attempted to determine the exact
point at which Shem became able to use “I see what you’re saying” as a metaphoric representation
of “I understand what you mean”; where “[s]eeing is the metaphorical source domain used to
conceptualize knowledge, but it is not used literally”140. The interesting part is that, before Shem
was able to use this metaphor, he entered a stage of conflation between the two concepts, where
knowing and seeing domains were confused with one another. This conflation allows for the
cultivation of a primary metaphor where, after the period of conflation is over, the child would be
capable of differentiating between the two concepts. Conflations, Lakoff and Johnson argue, “are
instances of coactivation of both domains, during which permanent neural connections between
the domains develop”141.
is, and why these two statements sound like they’re contradicting one another, is that “to date no such convincing
solution has been proposed” regarding which of the number of theories explaining the extent of conceptual knowledge
structure dependent on sensorimotor systems. – Gallese and Lakoff, “The Brain's Concepts,” 457.
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Christopher Johnson’s work paved the way for Joseph Grady’s theory of primary
metaphors which tried to explain how subjective judgment is based on sensorimotor domains.
Lakoff and Johnson describe primary metaphors as “an atomic component of the molecular
structure of complex metaphors”142, and they stress that they are “not the result of a conscious
multistage process of interpretation. Rather it is a matter of immediate conceptual mapping via
neural connections”143. One example of a primary metaphor is “Similarity Is Closeness”, where
the subjective judgment “similarity” is tied to the sensorimotor domain “closeness” where the
primary experience involved in both is observing how similar things are clustered together, such
as flowers or trees. What this means is that the perceptual neural structure which is involved in
observing the closeness of things is the same one responsible for discerning that these close things,
more often than not, are similar. To put it simply, the ability to think a concept such as grasping,
“makes use of the same neural substrate as performing and perceiving grasping”144, and the ability
to think a concept such as similarity involves the same neural substrate as perceiving closeness. In
other words, conception piggybacks on perception145.
What this essentially means is that: a) at least in their early stages of formation, concepts
are interlinked to phenomenal characters (such as intimacy correlating with proximity), and b) that
concepts depend on their formation on sensorimotor and perceptual systems (the concept grasping
making use of same neural substrate as performing and perceiving grasping). This is significant
because: a) it opens up the possibility that a phenomenal character can be identified as the source
of a concept or a number of concepts, and b) that in thinking with these concepts, the same neural
substrata of experiencing this phenomenal character is involved as well. If we take these two ideas
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and apply them to the case of blindsight patients being presented with a vertical line, then since
the perceptual system of the patient is capable of discriminating the shape it sees and sending the
information down to P-consciousness (a condition argued for by Zeki’s micro-consciousness
theory), and if this entails firing the same neural path as the ones involved in symbolic concepts
which are part of A-consciousness, then the executive system can determine the range of
possibilities involved in firing this particular neural path and then make a guess based on it, all
without the information registering in P-consciousness. What we’re saying is that since the neural
structure of concepts as we think of them in A-consciousness converges with the neural structure
of phenomenal experience from sensorimotor and perceptual systems, then the activation of the
latter should entail an activation of the first. The difference in the blindsight patient is the absence
of a phenomenal character which, in the case of normal population, would act as a verification tool
to decisively determine which of the range of possibilities is the correct one, i.e. how a specific
stimulus usually used to appear to the subject. This would be the reason why the blindsight patient
is able to guess but not know whether the line is horizontal or vertical. We still argue that the
phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is as important as the phenomenal concept
generated by that perceptual experience. Neither of them alone can accurately determine what is
it the subject is perceiving. The coupling of discrimination of the phenomenal concept and the
experience of the phenomenal character is what guarantees the validity of perception.
o Premise 2: Perceptual Discrimination
This premise is a further elaboration on Zeki’s thesis of micro-consciousness to highlight
two things: the hierarchical nature of processing certain features of stimuli, and the uncoupling of
awareness and discrimination as two distinct capacities. Take the processing of the full experience
of color in three distinct cortical stages, each with its own function. The first two stages, in V1/V2
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and V4, represent the computational aspect of color perception, and are concerned with the
registration and the comparative processing of color, respectively146. The third stage, beyond V4,
is concerned more “not with computing colours in an abstract sense, but with object and surface
colours”147. Accordingly, the processing of color, in the model of Zeki and Marini, reconsolidated
both computational theories of color processing with cognitive ones that depended on memory and
object recognition. But most importantly for our purposes, it showed that the profiling of color
itself does not need processing beyond V4 before it is successful; i.e. discrimination of color does
not require more complex processing, while connecting the color with the object/surface requires
further processing elsewhere in the brain.
Similarly, the discrimination of certain features of stimuli does not require further
hierarchical processing. For example, Zeki and Ffytche were able to demonstrate that activation in
area V5, which is critical for perception of visual motion, in a blindsight patient, despite the patient
suffering from legions in V1 area, correlated with the patient’s ability to discriminate the type of
motion (fast or slow) involved in the presented stimulus. In other words, activation of V5 “elicit[s]
a conscious discrimination”148 in the blindsight patient, without necessarily being aware of the
stimulus in play 149 . This suggested that the coupling of awareness, understood as reporting a
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perceptual experience, and discrimination, understood as identifying features of presented stimulus,
in normal population is actually two distinct processes occurring simultaneously, and that the
uncoupling which happens in the case of blindsight is what allowed us to realize the difference
between the capacity for awareness and ability for discrimination. This suggested that blindsight
patients’ ability to discriminate is not unconscious, like Block claimed, but rather is “conscious,
yet severely degraded vision”150. By extending the same logic to the normal population, we can
claim that discrimination itself, which correlates to activation of particular visual areas in the brain,
is a form of degraded conscious vision.
Accordingly, if, in the case of the vertical line, the capacity of the blindsight patient to
discriminate whether the line is horizontal or vertical correlates to specific activation of certain
areas associated with detecting spatial orientation, then we can push for the claim that as long as
the visual information can reach the appropriate specialized module, then information regarding
the orientation should be available regardless of whether or not that information registers as
phenomenal character. Interestingly, research has shown that “human visual sensitivity and acuity
is typically better at horizontal and vertical orientations than at oblique orientations”151. Furmanski
and Engel demonstrated that orientation-specific signals arise early in visual processing, where an
asymmetry has been observed in “the responses of human primary visual cortex (V1) to oriented
stimuli”152; specifically, that “V1 produces a larger response to cardinal stimuli than to oblique
stimuli”153. These results proposed the possibility that “distinct populations of neurons within a
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cortical area can be isolated and functionally linked to perception”154,155. If we suppose that the
lesions in V1 in the case of the blindsight patient do not affect the particular groups of neurons that
are sensitive towards cardinal rather than oblique orientation, and if these groups of neurons share
a capacity for discrimination similar to that in the case of V5 and motion, then that already gives
us a neural basis for how the specialized modules of blindsight patients are capable of
consciously 156 discriminating between horizontal and vertical lines without the need for
hierarchical processing, since the question they’re asked is specifically about a single feature
which has been processed accurately.
We felt it important to reiterate here that this thesis is in no way endorsing this model as
something which can be generalized. All we are attempting to present is a case where a
phenomenal concept features in rational thinking without the accompanying phenomenal character
as a way of arguing that it does exist as its own class of concepts. What is left now is to answer
how exactly can the executive system guess certain aspects of a stimulus that has been processed
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and discriminated by certain brain regions without the information passing through a phenomenal
consciousness?
o Premise 3: The Nature of Representation (Neural Tracing)
If we look at the previous question with respect to the full argument we are developing, we
can say that since what is in play in the case of a blindsight patient is a form of a “severely degraded
vision”, than what is being produced is also a form of a severely degraded representation. If we
take a representation to involve a perceptual experience, a correlated phenomenal experience, and
an instantiated phenomenal concept, and if we consider the capacity of the blindsight patient to
guess that the line is vertical as a successful diminished representation, then we need to ask how it
is possible for a representation to only involve a phenomenal concept, without phenomenal
content.157
In his discussion of the relationship between memory and representation, Norman Malcolm
argues against the idea that, what is involved in recalling a memory is “an image, copy, picture,
pattern or representation”158. Instead, he argued for what he described as neural trace, stating that:
You have an experience. The experience itself cannot survive the passage of time; but the
structure of the experience can be stored in the brain. The neural mechanism that performs
this function is the trace. As long as the trace persists you have a "dispositional" memory
of the experience. The experience is "coded" into the trace. If one knew the code […] one
could "read off" an experience from its trace. When the trace is subjected to the right sort
of stimulus an "occurrent" memory results, which contains an active representation of the
original experience.159
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What this means is that as long as there is a capacity for this neural trace, the information should
be relayed to whichever part of the brain traced this information. Consider the following story in
the case of a blindsight patient: The executive system has seen many cardinal shapes in its day. It
has marked the neural path the signal takes in travelling from the specialized module to
phenomenal binding160. Once that path is triggered again, the executive system can make a guess
as to which of the two most likely answers is the correct one. Whether this happens based on a
specific sequence of firing or the involvement of a specific set of neurons is ambiguous at this
point. What is unambiguous is that so long as the neural path is activated, a diminished
representation can be traced by the executive system A-consciously.
Much like in the case of uncoupling discrimination from awareness, where the information
necessary for discriminating a stimulus does not require the subject to be aware of it, a case of
uncoupling the relationship between A-consciousness and P-consciousness can be argued, where
the information needed to report on a stimulus can be traced by A-consciousness without the
verification of phenomenal character.
What adds support to this understanding is that, given Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of
primary metaphor, which argues that the neural substrata of sensorimotor domains allow for the
conventional mental imagery “to be used for domains of subjective experience”, then one can
argue that as long as these neural substrata are activated, the executive system should notice this
activation. It would certainly be an odd experience for the executive system, and the subject as
well, to have information which they are unable to connect with specific phenomenal character,
but we can conceive of the phenomenal character which accompanies a situation like this to be
one of puzzlement. The case, then, for the blindsight patient, and what sets them apart from normal
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population, is that the neural trace in their perception involves triggering mechanisms that are only
specifically designed to think about the associated concepts, i.e. the executive system, and not
those which are equipped with triggering the accompanying phenomenal character, i.e.
phenomenal binding. In other words, it is a case of conscious uncoupling.
To demonstrate this idea of representations as neural tracing, consider for instance the
patients with damage to their hippocampi. One of the more famous patients, referred to in the
literature as KC, and earlier as NN, provided the following introspection to Endel Tulving in 1985
who was following up with him at the time. KC states that asking him to envision his future is
“like being in a room with nothing there and having a guy tell you to go find a chair, and there’s
nothing there”, and in another occasion, as “swimming in the middle of a lake. There’s nothing
there to hold you up or do anything with” 161. Tulving hypothesized that “recollection and episodic
future thought are two sides of the same core cognitive capacity, which he termed ‘autonoetic (selfknowing) consciousness’”162. This means that, despite understanding the concept of future, the
patient was unable to fulfill the content which falls under that concept in their everyday life; as if
the concepts turned into an empty set. As if, to be more imaginative, the lever inside the executive
system which is responsible for triggering the neural trace that allowed for the realization of the
concept “future” and its application to a set of data still exist, albeit without the wiring which
allows for such neural tracing to take place, which in turn did not allow for a representation to be
possible.
§

Conclusion:

Based on our premises, we can argue that
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P1. If symbolic concepts are built up on sensorimotor and perceptual systems, meaning
they’re the product of a process of symbolic encoding from their original form as phenomenal
concepts
P2. If specific areas in the brain are capable of discriminating stimuli without necessarily
being aware of them, meaning that the processing of a stimuli is enough to trigger the concept
associated with it without necessarily having a phenomenal content attached to it
P3. If representations are processes of neural tracing,
C. then the blindsight patient’s executive system does have a representation of the
phenomenal concept, albeit diminished and uncorroborated by phenomenal character, which is
produced by processing the stimulus in the specialized module; a representation which is possible
through tracing which neural path is active during the perceptually-positive/phenomenallynegative experience of the stimulus. This means that what the executive system really lacks in the
case of blindsight is phenomenal content as a verification tool163 – which pushes the executive
system to guess by eliminating one of the two possibilities it is presented with, based on previous
experience. The question to be tackled now concerns the extent of control phenomenal concepts
can have over behavior, precisely in cases of diminished A-consciousness.

Section III: The Behavioral Question
-

The purpose of this section is to argue that phenomenal concepts can affect behavior in
the case of an absent/diminished A-consciousness.
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This idea of phenomenal content as a verification tool can be used to argue for why hallucination do not seem to
be real despite their engagement with the same neural paths used during perception. Perhaps all there is for a someone
realizing he is hallucinating a dagger floating in the air is that the phenomenal character of the experience seems odd
when coupled with the phenomenal concept.
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In a 1995 experiment, a group of researchers lead by Sarah Boysen, offered chimps two trays of
candy; one with a lesser number of candy than the other. In order to choose, the chimp has to
point at one of the trays. The catch, however, is that the chimp then gets the other tray and not
the one it chose. In Boysen’s lab, chimps “seem unable to learn to make the optimal choice here,
despite hundreds of trials”164; they tended to choose the tray with the more candy. GodfreySmith refers to this as the “candy-versus-candy (“c/c”) condition”165.
Having learned Arabic numerals in other experiments, the chimps were then presented
with the problem again – this time with numerals instead of candy. The chimps tended to
perform well in this task almost immediately. One explanation for that, as Godfrey-Smith
elaborated following Boysen, is that a “basic or primitive perception–action mechanism is
interfering with information processing. The use of symbols frees the chimp from the constraints
of this primitive mechanism, and the chimp can then exercise the right choice.”166.
In the first follow up, instead of the candy/candy condition, the group introduced a
rock/rock condition to test whether “the intrinsic desirability of the candies that is causing the
trouble, or are there deeper differences between thinking in terms of concrete objects and thinking
in terms of symbols?”167. The chimps “did almost as badly with the rock/rock condition as they
did with the c/c one”168 which ruled out this possibility. In the second follow up, the group used
mixed pairs of trays, candy/numeral, and found that the chimps treated the this more like
numeral/numeral and not like candy/candy. Godfrey-Smith notes that “[t]he presence of one
numeral was enough to get them on track to make the right choice”169. The results suggest that the
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chimps are engaged in “a different kind of processing” in dealing with numerals than when they
are dealing with objects, as the symbolic representation of the problem “makes possible more
flexible, information-driven, and decision-theoretically rational behavior”170.
A similar situation of this sort of automatic behavior can be seen in epileptics with seizure
during performing mundane tasks. It is observed that they “continue their activities in a routinized,
mechanical way despite, [as John Searle argues], a total lack of consciousness”171. Block goes into
a lengthy discussion disputing the claim that there is a lack of consciousness per se172. What he
argues is that what is lacking in the epileptics is A-consciousness and not P-consciousness. He
asks, in the case of a walking epileptic,
Doesn’t he see the obstacles he avoids? Suppose he gets home by turning right at a red wall.
Isn’t there something it is like for him to see the red wall—and isn’t it different from what
it is like for him to see a green wall? Searle gives no reason to think the answer is no.
Because of the very inflexibility and lack of creativity of the behavior they exhibit, it is the
thought processes of these patients (including A-consciousness) that are most obviously
deficient; no reason at all is given to think that their P-conscious states lack vivacity or
intensity.173
Block then likens the case of a walking epileptic to that of a distracted driver. He argues that in
both cases, there is no reason to claim that P-consciousness is absent, but there is some reason to
think that “perhaps his A-consciousness of what he sees is diminished. (Of course, it can’t be
totally gone or the car would crash.)” 174 . This idea of a diminished A-consciousness can be
understood in terms of habits. Anyone who took on a semi-mechanical job can relate to how, in
certain times when one is busy thinking of something else, the person might lack distinct memory
of the tasks performed, yet evidence would suggest they have been performed well enough.
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What is common between the three cases of the chimps, the walking epileptic and the
distracted driver is that they lack creativity and voluntary decision making (ignoring the cognitive
differences between the subjects in three cases, of course). What they tell us is an ability from the
side of P-consciousness to step up and take over behavior, either radically in the case of the chimps,
or in a manner in line with delegations in the cases of the walking epileptic and the distracted
driver. The question here is, can P-consciousness take control over rational behavior even in cases
where A-consciousness is not diminished? We can already observe this happening on two
occasions: reflexes and diverting attention. If a person sees a ball hurling towards him, the person
will move his hand to fend his face without freely deciding to do so. There is no “conscious
decision” to lift his arm to fend off the ball. In the case of attention, consider how it can be directed
both intentionally and unintentionally:
Top-down influences are based on the observer’s “internal” experience, much concerned
with one’s intention, constituted by past experiences and expectations over that context and
scenario. Bottom-up influences, on the other hand, are based on facts that are external to
the observer, mainly built from stimulus salience which, by its turn, represents the degree
of attracting one’s attention based on basic features from the visual map. In another way
to put it, top-down (endogenous attentional control) is what you expect and bottom-up
(exogenous attentional control) is the summation of basic physical characteristics of items
in a visual display. Consequently, visual attention can be voluntarily directed to goaldriven purposes, such as looking for something you lost at a public place, however
remaining open to random salient stimuli, like a flash of light.175
This opens up an interesting feature of specialized modules processing of features of stimuli, which
is the urgency value a specialized module would assign to information about a stimulus, and how
the “summation of basic physical characteristics of items in a visual display”, or phenomenal
binding as we would call it, takes into consideration these assigned values when making the
decision to either maintain the decision of the executive system to continue focusing on goal-
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driven purposes, or to override the decision of the executive system and divert attention towards a
specific stimulus which was deemed urgent by the specialized module.176
If we take this understanding and apply it to such a highly contested case as the distracted
driver, we find that the debate has been centered around the wrong questions. While Michael Tye
argues for the possibility of a distracted driver since he accepts first-order representation, and
Wayne Wright argues against that possibility through what he calls “higher-order attention theory”,
both philosophers fail to tell is anything about the urgency value of the stimuli surrounding the
distracted driver. Compare a driver who has been driving one the same dusty slim empty road
between his house and his work for the past 10 years to another driver who has only been driving
for 10 days and is getting on the freeway. Naturally, the first driver can afford to be distracted
since his diminished sense of A-consciousness about his surroundings, his habitual behavior, can
take over and deliver him to his destination without much intervention from a more elaborate Aconsciousness given how no creativity is required to perform that task. On the contrary, the driver
on the freeway cannot afford to get distracted or else he will most certainly crash. Both Tye and
Wright are correct in regarding the distracted driver, but both are inadequately representing the
whole spectrum of possibilities regarding which level of representation is required to perform the
task under specific circumstances.
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Chapter III: Neurophilosophy and Epistemology Naturalized
We have now argued our case that thought always involves phenomenal concepts. We reckon it is
important here to note that what we have argued is not some form of behavioral determinism,
whereby a certain phenomenal concept entails a necessary behavioral outcome—far from it. What
we argued is simply that upon coming in contact with a stimulus, the content of a phenomenal
concept necessarily becomes available for the free use of reasoning for the experiencing subject.
The necessity condition we are arguing is between stimulus s and phenomenal concept c, and not
between phenomenal concept c and behavior b. What the subject does with c is a matter of
reasoning, except perhaps in cases of reflexes. What’s next is to survey the philosophical
theoretical space in order to ground our thesis within established doctrines. We will begin by
discussing the concept and methodology of neurophilosophy, followed by a survey of theories of
consciousness, then a survey of theories of perception, and ending with a discussion of the concept
of epistemology naturalized. What our thesis aligns itself with is Block’s Biological theory of
consciousness, Phenomenalism, and two-factor semantics. Our liberal use of the word “survey” is
prompted by our method of highlighting the relevant parts of a favorable theoretical landmark by
contrasting it with neighboring contesting ideas. We ask the reader to proceed with the
understanding that the limited space we have does not allow to fully dive into each of the
theoretical landmark, but only to present how our work relates to it.

Prologue: Neurophislosophy
Just as the name suggests, neurophilosophy is concerned with measuring up our philosophical
theories of the mind to our understanding of the neurology of the brain. It presupposes a type of
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mind-brain correlation177, i.e. “correlations between mental phenomena and neural states of the
brain”178. A formulation of the mind-brain thesis can be seen as follows:
For each type M of mental event that occurs to an organism o, there exists a brain state of
kind B (M’s “neural correlate” or “substrate”) such that M occurs to o at time t if and only
if B occurs to o at t.179,180
However, the study of neurophilosophy is not only restricted to the neurology of the brain. In the
introduction to her book “Neurophilosophy,” Patricia Churchland explains that
The sustaining conviction of this book is that top-down strategies (as characteristic of
philosophy, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence research) and bottom-up
strategies (as characteristic of the neurosciences) for solving the mysteries of mind-brain
function should not be pursued in icy isolation from one another. What is envisaged instead
is a rich interanimation between the two, which can be expected to provoke a fruitful coevolution of theories, models, and methods, where each informs, corrects, and inspires the
other.181
Thus, we can say that our methodology in this thesis has been in line with Patricia Churchland’s
understanding of how an investigation into neurophilosophy should be carried on: we have used
experiments from behavioral psychology in conjunction with our neural understanding of the
nature of hallucinations to argue for the outwardly nature of consciousness 182 . We have also
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considered the neural basis of perception in conjunction with cognitive theories of concept
formation to come to an understanding of the nature of phenomenal concepts.
Neurophilosophy also presupposes, on the conception of Churchland, a type of naturalized
epistemology whereby they both reject the idea of a first philosophy in favor of an understanding
of science that needs no Archimedean point of view from which it can be assessed.183 It embraces
the formal circularity that this entails and moves on with its projects. Later on, we will discuss the
concept of naturalized epistemology in some detail. At the moment, we need to answer the
question: following our long discussion of the outwardly nature of consciousness and phenomenal
concepts, which established theory of consciousnesses would our thesis support?

Section I: The Biological Side of Things
Our understanding of the theoretical framework of studying consciousness falls within the realm
of the Biological Theory of Consciousness. According to it, “consciousness is some sort of
biological state of the brain” 184 whereby, for instance, the visual experience of motion is
identifiable in terms of a brain state of the activation of area MT+ in the visual cortex.185 We have
explained how we see the activation of a certain specialized module as the cause for both a
phenomenal concept and its phenomenal content. The theory contends that “the specific geometry
of the connectivity matters; […] the location of specific neuromodulators and their effects matter;
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[…] the architecture matters; […] the fine temporal rhythms of the spiking patterns matter”186,187.
It also presupposes that “transfer of coding of information from electrical to chemical and back to
electrical is necessary to consciousness”188. Thus, our understanding of the biology and neurology
of the brain contributes to our understanding of the nature of consciousness.
Naturally, the Biological theory does not operate in a vacuum. In a paper titled “Comparing
the Major Theories of Consciousness,” Ned Block compares it with two other major theories:
Higher-Order-Thought (or HOT) theory and Global Workspace theory189. HOT argues that “a
[phenomenally]conscious experience of red consists in a representation of red in the visual system
accompanied by a thought in the same subject to the effect that the subject is having the experience
of red”190. Global Workspace is a form of functionalism, whereby the perceptual systems produce
representations which are consumed by reporting mechanisms, which in turn supply
representations that are further consumed by the same set of mechanisms.191 Block’s discussion is
rich and long, and we lack the space to go through it in detail. Rather, what we wish to do is to
highlight the points of contestation that our thesis has with HOT and Global Workspace.
Although the Global Workspace theory “is motivated and described in neural terms”192,
it’s fundamental claim can be easily applied to silicon-based computers just as it can be applied to
biological entities like us193. It views consciousness as “an abstract structure that does not include
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the messy details of neuroscience” 194 . Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, evidence from
Zeki’s work puts pressure on forms of Global Workspace, which suggest an underlying temporary
memory operating in the background, given how subjects systematically mis-bind information
about stimuli in their phenomenal perception.
Regarding HOT theorists195, the problem lies in its over commitment to the cognitive rather
than the phenomenal aspect of our mental life. Both Biological and Global theorists see HOT as a
hyper-intellectualist thesis, while HOT theorists hold that the Biological and Global Workspace
theories “underestimate the role of cognition in consciousness”196. In our first chapter, we have
already flipped the claim of HOT upside down. Rather than argue that an explicitly A-conscious
cognitive thought is required to experience a P-conscious experience, we have established that
phenomenal experience is a necessary component to have any thought at all, in biological beings.
For in cases of sensory restriction where subjects’ perceptual systems are deprived of stimulation,
the subject’s executive system begins to solicit stimulation, either by magnifying the already
minimal stimulation available or by creating hallucinatory perceptual content of which it can have
a phenomenal experience. Moreover, Block argues that given how “newborns who are circumcised
without anesthesia or analgesia are more stressed by later vaccination even 6 months later”197, and
that the “frontal cortex, the likely neural home of thought about thought […] is immature in
infancy”198, then that puts pressure on arguing for the need for an explicit A-conscious thought in
order to be able to experience a phenomenal experience.
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Now that we have given a brief account of why we believe the Biological theory has more
appeal than other theories, we need to take a look at which established theory of perception does
our thesis champion.

Section II: First-Order Representationalism, Phenomenalism, and NEF
Within the biological theory of consciousness, two major theories lay claim to the way the
operation of perception occurs: first-order representationalism (or FOR) which argues that “any
conscious state is a representation, and what it’s like to be in a conscious state is wholly determined
by the content of that representation”199, and phenomenalism which argues that “the phenomenal
character of experience is [not] exhausted by such representational content”200. Formulated like
this, they look like two completely incompatible theses. However, three observations would
suggest a deeper affinity between the two theses:
1- Phenomenalism is expansive enough to accommodate representationalist claims. For
instance, representationalism insists on the “narrow intentional content” 201 in the
phenomenal character of an experience. Phenomenalism does not object to cases of
experiences having a narrow intentional content. This much both theories are in agreement
about. What phenomenalism adds is that the intentional content is not exhaustive of the
phenomenal character of the experience. On this view of FOR, the disagreement is on
whether or not the phenomenal character is solely determined by the content of the
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representation. Thus, there’s no issue regarding the informational content of experience
between the two theses.
2- On Dretske’s view of FOR, he maintains that the representationalist thesis concedes that
“[t]he qualitative character [qualia] of perceptual experience […] is not functionally
definable. It is, however, physically definable” 202 . This view is in agreement with the
phenomenalist thesis, given that both theses agree that a biological basis is part of the
perceptual experience. Perhaps what Dretske would object to is the claim that the
phenomenal content is accompanied by a phenomenal concept, i.e. as the product of lowerbrain functions, but this much is not clear from our reading.
3- Misreading of the phenomenalist thesis lead to more confusion about what it actually
claims. Mehta and Mashour claim that advocates of the biological theory of consciousness
“identifies sensory (and perhaps also post-sensory) processing regions as the neural
correlates of general consciousness”203,204. Problem is, when reading closely, one cannot
find such identification. Block maintains that “[o]f course, an activated MT+ even with
feedback to lower visual areas is not all by itself sufficient for phenomenal consciousness.
No one thinks that a section of visual cortex in a bottle would be conscious”205. Furthermore,
as we have stated in an earlier footnote in Chapter 1, Zeki maintains that it is true that “over
longer periods of time, in excess of 500 ms, we do see different attributes in perfect
temporal and spatial registration, which itself demands an explanation”206. This perfect
temporal and spatial registration does not suggest that the mere processing of stimulation
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within a specialized module is sufficient for general (or macro-consciousness), it only
suggests that more research is needed in order to answer how macro-consciousness is
possible.
Perhaps one issue that does put a divide between the two theses is the position each theory takes
regarding the semantics of representation. Chris Eliasmith explains that there are 3 classes of
perceptual semantic theories: causal (championed by Fred Dretske and Jerry Fodor), conceptualrole (championed by Gilbert Harman and Brian Loar), and two-factor theories (championed by
Ned Block and Harty Field) 207 , 208 . Within his discussion of Neural Engineering Framework
(NEF)209, Eliasmith differentiates between encoding, that is “the process of responding to some
physical environmental variable through the generation of neural action potentials, or ‘spike
trains’”210, and decoding, which is the process by which a system decodes “the value of a variable
as it is encoded into neural spikes train”211. Between encoding and decoding, Eliasmith maintains
that one of the key contributions of theoretical neuroscience has been “not to assume that the
stimuli presented to an animal is automatically, or fully represented, despite observed
correlations” 212 . This idea puts pressure on the view of the naïve causal theory, under which
representationalism can be filed, which says that “a brain state represents whatever causes it to be
active” 213 . Rather, this view of the transmission and transformation of information between
207
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perceptual systems and post-sensory systems changes the nature of the transmitted information
lends support to Block’s and Field’s two-factor semantic theory.214 But given, as we saw above,
that Dretske concedes that the qualia of an experience is physically defined rather than functionally
defined, which downplays the conceptual role of his semantics, it is not clear how much difference
there is between his theory of representation and Block’s two-factor semantic theory.

Section III: Epistemology Naturalized
The natural companion to arguing for a biological theory of consciousness is a naturalized version
of epistemology. Quine’s thesis comes to the fore as one of the most prominent attempts at giving
an argument for naturalizing epistemology. It is, however, outside the scope of this thesis to give
a comprehensive argument for it. What we can do is give a brief account of Quine’s thesis and run
through the opinions of some of its critics to highlights its relevant contributions.
Quine’s Thesis
As mentioned earlier in our discussion of the term “neurophilosophy”, the central point of Quine’s
thesis is to do away with any “Archimedean point outside all science from which we can pronounce
upon the acceptability of scientific theories” 215 . He describes it as embracing the image of a
“mariner who has to rebuild his boat while staying afloat in it”216. Quine “believes that science
requires no justification beyond measuring up to observation and the hypothetico-deductive
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method” 217 and called for “epistemology [to merge] with psychology, as well as with
linguistics”218. Our project in this thesis, of arguing for the outwardly nature of consciousness and
the existence of phenomenal concepts, can be identified in accordance with the Quinian project of
determining the “limited alphabet of perceptual norms […] toward which we tend unconsciously
to rectify all perceptions. These, if experimentally identified, could be taken as epistemological
building blocks, the working elements of experience”219.
However, this move towards naturalizing epistemology has been widely criticized by some
as a move to reduce epistemology to psychology (see for instance Putnam 1982, Stroud 1984,
Davidson 1991, and Almeder 2002), while others argued that his thesis is not that different from
the program of traditional epistemologists (see Foley 1994 and Jonsen 2005). Nonetheless, a closer
look at Quine’s own formulation of the issue tells a different story. He maintains:
The old epistemology aspired to contain, in a sense, natural science; it would construct it
somehow from sense data. Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained in
natural science, as a chapter of psychology. But the old containment remains valid too, in
its way. We are studying how the human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his
physics from his data, and we appreciate that our position in the world is just like his. Our
very epistemological enterprise, therefore, and the psychology wherein it is a component
chapter, and the whole of natural science wherein psychology is a component book – all
this is our own construction or projection from stimulations like those we were meting out
to our epistemological subject. There is thus reciprocal containment, though containment
in different senses: epistemology in natural science and natural science in epistemology.220
The language Quine uses here is in direct contradiction to the charge of reducing epistemology to
psychology. However, as we will shortly showcase in the three instances of criticism we will
explore, the issues critics take with Quine systematically miss the mark regarding the true nature
of the Quinian project.
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1. Stroud, The Skeptic
In a chapter titled “Naturalized Epistemology,” Stroud argues that Quine’s conception of
epistemology suggests his underlying commitment to skepticism. Stroud maintained that “the
specific task for Quine is to understand how our knowledge is possible by understanding how the
‘meager input’ at our sensory surfaces gives rise to the ‘torrential output’ in the form of sentences
we accept as true about the external physical world” 221 . He maintains that “[t]he theory of
knowledge for Quine as for the tradition has its origin in doubt and the threat of scepticism”, and
proceeds to quote Quine who says, “Doubt prompts the theory of knowledge, yes; but knowledge,
also, was what prompted the doubt. Scepticism is an offshoot of science”222.
Stroud, however, criticizes Quine’s declaration that “skeptical doubts are really scientific
doubts”. He calls this an attempt at a reductio ad absurdum to the skeptic project of questioning
our knowledge of the external world by assuming that the skeptic must presuppose science in order
to question it. Quine’s solution was that this presupposition from the skeptic would allow the
epistemologist to use the best available science to answer the skeptic, however, Stroud counters
that “the fact that 'sceptical doubts are scientific doubts' does not put the epistemologist who raises
such doubts in the stronger position of being free to use scientific knowledge of the world in his
effort to answer those doubts and explain how knowledge is possible” 223 . In short, Stroud
maintains that “the epistemologist cannot use the now discredited science in constructing his/her
defense of science”224.
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However, as Roger Gibson explains in his rebuttal of Stroud’s reading of Quine, for the
skeptic to be able to “show that some scientific posits are epistemologically unwarranted, […] his
epistemological deliverances presuppose his interim acceptance of other scientific posits, namely,
those presupposed by his own theory of evidence”225. Here is exactly where we spot an instance
of appealing to an Archimedean point to judge science through. Quine’s main point is that
skepticism “does not occur in an ontological vacuum (i.e. transcendentally)” which would then
allow the skeptic the space to judge science. In fact, Quine’s perceive position is that there is no
possible world where skeptic doubts would presuppose nothing whatsoever. And since it has to
presuppose some facts about the world, and since there exists a reciprocal containment between
epistemology and natural science, then the skeptic cannot maintain an Archimedean point from
which he can judge science.
2. Davidson, The Externalist
In his article “Epistemology externalized,” Davidson rejects Quine’s account on the bases of it
being “essentially first person and Cartesian” 226 . He, however, agrees with naturalized
epistemology insofar as it propagates “third person approach to epistemology”227 . The line of
argument Davidson takes against Quine is reminiscent of the Moorean commonsense approach to
philosophical problems. He maintains that
as long as we adhere to the basic intuition that in the simplest cases words and thoughts
refer to what causes them, it is clear that it cannot happen that most of our plainest beliefs
about what exists in the world are false. The reason is that we do not first form concepts
and then discover what they apply to; rather, in the basic cases the application determines
the content of the concept.228
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As much as this point is true, Davidson seems to miss the crux of Quine’s thesis. There’s no doubt
that our concepts are molded by the application – we argued as much in Chapter 2 – however,
when it comes to scientific definitions, the appeal to conceptual conventionality is put under
pressure. In his explication of the formulation of definitions of scientific terms, Richard Boyd
explains, following Quine, that “[t]he correct definitions of a scientific term is an a posteriori
theoretical matter, not a matter of linguistic convention or stipulation”229. Moreover, as Patricia
Churchland maintained, that problems of the failures of imaginability puts pressure on any a priori
concepts we may have from conventional use.230
Furthermore, on the charge of Cartesianism, we find again the answer to that from Quine
himself who maintains that
The old tendency to associate observation sentences with a subjective sensory subject
matter is rather an irony when we reflect that observation sentences are also meant to be
the intersubjective tribunal of scientific hypotheses.231
Quine here makes the case that if we are to accuse observation sentences of appealing only to the
subjective sensory matter while simultaneously using them as a way of communicating
information between one another is an oxymoron. And since his theory, not only allows, but
advocates and refines observation sentences, then they cannot be making exclusive references only
to subjective sensory matters. In short, Quine and Davidson agree on the basics of third-person
approach to epistemology, but disagree on the extent of which our concepts, which are molded by
sense data, are a reliable source of explaining our knowledge of the world.
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3. Putnam, The Pluralist
In his article “Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized,” Putnam takes issues with naturalizing
epistemology, accusing it of following a positivist agenda that seeks to undermine the wide variety
of human knowledge in favor of a mechanical account of human reason. According to Steven
Wagner and Richard Warner, Putnam champions cultural relativism and argues that Quine’s
naturalized epistemology is an attack on normativity, and that
Philosophers who lose sight of the immanence of reason, of the fact that reason is always
relative to context and institution, become lost in characteristic philosophical fantasies.
“The ideal language,” “inductive logic,” “the empiricist criterion of significance”— these
are the fantasies of the positivist, who would replace the vast complexity of human reason
with a kind of intellectual Walden II.232,233
He further accuses Quine of occupying an outside point of view which he describes it as “metametalinguistic” where “there is no unique "world", no unique "intended model". Only structure
matters”234,235. He makes reference to Quine’s unfortunate formulation of his thesis when he asks
the infamous question: “Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle
for psychology?” 236 . This, Putnam takes it, is a clear assault on normativity and calls it an
“attempted mental suicide”237.
While others, such as Jonsen 2005, agree with him on the unfortunate formulation of
Quine’s question, we take issue with singling out this one question as a declaration of the death of
the normative. The question, presented at the middle of the essay, can just as easily be read as a
rhetorical question; one which invites the reader to follow along the Quinian line of thought. The
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reason for our argument is that the question does not sit right with Quine’s later comments
regarding the reciprocal containment between epistemology and natural science. In this mush
Jonsen agrees with our reading: that Putnam misses the mark by neglecting Quine’s project of
merging together epistemology and psychology rather than eliminating psychology. Jonsen
understand that Quine does not seek to eliminate the normative,
so far is he from proposing to abandon the normative that he is proposing instead to
discover the norms that govern theorizing by discovering the norms that we conform to in
our theorizing. […] What he is actually proposing is to enlist the aid of psychology in
addressing the burden of epistemology: psychology will identify the norms we adhere to,
and philosophy will tell us that, by virtue of their being the ones we adhere to, they are the
ones we are to adhere to.238
Nevertheless, one can see the validity of Putnam’s concerns within their own context. Wagner and
Warner argue that Putnam’s concerns follow those of Nelson Goodman, who “defends the arts on
the grounds that they make cognitive contributions fundamentally similar to those of science”239.
If this is the case behind Putnam’s advocation for “a centerless pluralism that recognizes the human
value of diverse inquiries” 240 , then Putnam’s issue should be directed towards the purely
positivists/eliminativists. However, as it stands, Quine seems to be advocating for understanding
the normative, rather than eliminating it. A project which Putnam should have no direct issues
with.

Notes on the Theory and its Critics
The idea behind the Quinian project, as Richard Foley crudely and rightly puts it, is “to make sure
that our philosophical theories are compatible with science”241. However, it does not follow from
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this that we restrict our epistemological endeavor to only what science has already deemed correct.
The idea is that theories must not depend on our desire to “deduce science from sense data”242,
meaning that we do not stop only at what we are capable of conceiving, but to be founded on the
best available scientific knowledge, which could be empirically accurate despite our inability to
conceive of it through sense data243 . Remember that Quine “believes that science requires no
justification beyond measuring up to observation and the hypothetico-deductive method”244. The
word “hypothetico” allows for going beyond the present state of knowledge, while the word
“deductive” insures it is still empirically grounded. As we have maintained in the introduction,
even Descartes used the best available scientific knowledge in his endeavor. This tradition
continued until Kant and beyond. Thus, the reader of the history of philosophy will find it is not
the most radical of ideas245.
One interesting distinction between Quine and his critics is that the critics seem to
unanimously miss what Block called “a confusion about a function of consciousness”246, namely
the distinction between A- and P-Consciousnesses. What they seem to implicitly adopt is what is
described by Michael Tye as a transparency thesis 247 , 248 whereby there’s little to no barriers
between when a stimulus falls on perceptual system and the utterance of an observation
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sentence.249 Quine himself seems at times guilty of that, especially when he speaks about the
connection between stimulation and observation sentences. What prompts us to argue that Quine
has a similar understanding of the distinction between the two types of consciousnesses is his
distinction between doctrinal and conceptual studies, as explained by Johnsen
In the terms of Quine's broad framework in "Epistemology Naturalized," subjects'
constructions of their world-pictures and Carnap's efforts at rational reconstruction fall on
opposite sides of his division of epistemology into doctrinal and conceptual studies.
Subjects engaged in constructing pictures of the world are developing "doctrines" that are
the objects of doctrinal studies, which concern, inter alia, the justifiability of those
doctrines; Carnap's efforts at reconstruction are conceptual studies aimed at showing that
the everyday concepts employed in formulating those doctrines are theoretically
dispensable in favor of sense data, or observations, plus logic and set theory.250
What this suggests is that Quine at least was aware of the distinction between the nature of the
concepts which allow a subject to construct his picture of the world, the phenomenal type, and
those used in order to reconstruct a normative view of these concepts, the linguistic type. In our
reading of Quine, this mirrors our distinction between phenomenal concepts, generated by the
contact between the subject and his world, and linguistic concepts, which carry the discursive mark.

Concluding Remarks
Quine maintained that “it is simply the stimulations of our sensory receptors that are best looked
upon as the input to our cognitive mechanism”251. Years later, Block made the distinction between
A-consciousness and P-consciousness. Then Zeki provided the neural bases which supports
Block’s theoretical distinction. These have been the guiding principles of this thesis. We attempted
to look at the first part in the process of coming in contact with a stimulation. We began by flipping
the position of HOT upside down by arguing that thought requires phenomenal character because
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of the outwardly nature of consciousness, then proceeded to argue that any phenomenal content
would necessarily be accompanied with a phenomenal concept, and that phenomenal concepts are
relevant, both conceptually and behaviorally. We then situated our thesis within the larger
theoretical field of theories of consciousness, perception and epistemology, to give the reader a
broader understanding of our project. Many questions still remain unanswered after the conclusion
of this particular project, but we remain hopeful that the continuous study of the brain will bring
to the fore answers to at least some of these questions.
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